A.L. 124 ta' l-2008

ATT DWAR POTERI LI JSIRU REGOLAMENTI FL-INTERESS NAZZJONALI (KAP. 365)

Regolamenti ta' l-2008 dwar Sanzjonijiet tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti (Sanzjonijiet Ulterjuri) fir-rigward ta' l-Iran

BIS-SAĦĦA tas-setgħat mogħtija bl-artikolu 3 ta' l-Att dwar Poteri li jsiru Regolamenti fl-Interess Nazzjonali, il-Prim Ministru għamel dawn ir-regolamenti li ġejjin:-

Titolu u Applikabilità.

1. It-titolu ta' dawn ir-regolamenti hu Regolamenti ta' l-2008 dwar Sanzjonijiet tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti (Sanzjonijiet Ulterjuri) fir-rigward ta' l-Iran.

Interpretazzjoni.

2. F'dawn ir-regolamenti, kemm-il darba r-rabta tal-kliem ma tkunx teħtieġ xort'oħra –

"l-Att" tfisser l-Att dwar Poteri li jsiru Regolamenti fl-Interess Nazzjonali;

"l-Annex I" tfisser l-Annex I tar-Riżoluzzjoni skond ir-regolament 3 ta' dawn ir-regolamenti;

"l-Annex II" tfisser l-Annex II tar-Riżoluzzjoni skond ir-regolament 3 ta' dawn ir-regolamenti;

"l-Annex III" tfisser l-Annex III tar-Riżoluzzjoni skond ir-regolament 3 ta' dawn ir-regolamenti;

"il-Kumitat" tfisser il-Kumitat tal-Kunsill tas-Sigurezza tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti msemmi fir-Regolamenti ta' l-2007 dwar Sanzjonijiet tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti fir-rigward ta' l-Iran; A.L. 14 ta' l-2007.

"IAEA" tfisser *International Atomic Energy Agency*, Aġenzija ta' l-Enerġija Atomika Internazzjonali;

"Iran" tfisser ir-Repubblika Iżlamika ta' l-Iran;

"ir-Riżoluzzjoni" tfisser ir-Riżoluzzjoni msemmija fir-regolament 3 ta' dawn ir-regolamenti;

"il-Kunsill tas-Sigurezza" tfisser il-Kunsill tas-Sigurezza tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti.

Test tar-Riżoluzzjoni 1803 (2008).

3. Għall-fini ta' l-artikolu 3 (4) ta' l-Att, Riżoluzzjoni numru 1803 (2008) adottata mill-Kunsill tas-Sigurezza tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti fit-3 ta' Marzu, 2008, qegħda tiġi ppubblikata fl-ilsien Ingliż fl-Iskeda li tinsab ma' dawn ir-regolamenti.

Notifika ta' dħul jew passaġġ minn Malta.

4. (1) Il-Kumitat għandu jiġi avżat jekk jidħlu f'Malta jew igħaddu mit-territorju ta' Malta persuni msemmija fl-*Annex I*, kif ukoll persuni oħra msemmija mill-Kunsill tas-Sigurezza jew mill-Kumitat bħala nies li huma mdaħħla, jew direttament assoċjati ma' jew jappoġġjaw il-proliferazzjoni ta' attivitajiet nukleari jew għall-iżvilupp ta' sistemi li jwasslu l-armi nukleari.

Sakemm dan id-dħul f'Malta jew dan il-passaġġ mit-territorju ta' Malta ma jkunx għall-attivitajiet li jkunu direttament relatati ma':

(a) forniment għal reatturi *light water*; jew

(b) uranju *low-enriched* meta jkun inkorporat ma' l-elementi tal-*fuel* nukleari għal dawn ir-reatturi.

(2) Xejn imsemmi fis-subregolament (1) ta' dan ir-regolament m'għandu jobbliga lil Malta tirrifjuta d-dħul ta' ċittadin Malti fit-territorju tagħha.

(3) Il-miżuri imposti bis-subregolament (1) ta' dan ir-regolament ma japplikawx meta jiġi stabbilit li dan l-ivvjaġġar huwa ġustifikat minħabba f'xi esiġenza umanitarja, inkluża obbligazzjoni reliġjuża.

Projbizzjoni ta' dħul jew passaġġ minn Malta.

5. (1) Hu ipprojbit li jidħlu f'Malta jew igħaddu mit-territorju ta' Malta persuni msemmija fl-*Annex II* kif ukoll persuni oħra msemmija mill-Kunsill tas-Sigurezza jew mill-Kumitat, li jkollhom x'jaqsmu ma', jew direttament assoċjati ma' jew jappoġġjaw il-proliferazzjoni ta' attivitajiet nukleari jew għall-iżvilupp ta' sistemi li jwasslu l-armi nukleari, inkluż jekk ikollhom x'jaqsmu mal-provediment ta' ħwejjeġ, forniment, materjal, teknoloġija u oġġetti projbiti:

Sakemm dan id-dħul jew passaġġ ma jkunx għal attivitajiet direttament relatati ma':

(a) forniment għal reatturi *light water*; jew

(b) uranju *low-enriched* meta jkun inkorporat ma' l-elementi tal-*fuel* nukleari għal dawn ir-reatturi.

(2) Xejn imsemmi fis-subregolament (1) ta' dan ir-regolament mgħandu jobbliga lil Malta tirrifjuta d-dħul ta' ċittadin Malti fit-territorju tagħha.

Iffriżar ta' flejjes.

A.L. 14 ta' l-2007.

6. Bis-saħħa ta' dan ir-regolament, regolament 10 tar-Regolamenti tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti dwar Sanzjonijiet fir-rigward ta' l-Iran, 2007, għandu japplikaw għall-persuni u entitajiet imsemmijin fl-*Annex I* u *Annex III*, u għal kull persuna jew entità li qed taġixxi f'isimhom jew taħt id-direzzjoni tagħhom, u għall-entitajiet posseduti jew kontrollati minnhom u għall-persuni u entitajiet imsemmija mill-Kunsill jew Kumitat li jkunu għenu persuni jew entitajiet fl-evażjoni tas-sanzjonijiet.

Projbizzjoni ta' provvista ta' oġġetti.

7. Huwa projbit il-forniment, bejgħ, jew trasferiment dirett jew indirett minn Malta, jew minn ċittadini ta' Malta, bl-użu ta' bastimenti jew ajruplani li jtajru l-bandiera ta' Malta, lil Iran jew għall-użu fih jew għall-benefiċċju tiegħu, kemm jekk joriġinaw minn Malta kif ukoll jekk le, ta':

(a) l-oġġetti kollha msemmija fl-INFCIRC/254/Rev 7/ Tieni Parti tad-dokument S/2006/814, ħlief meta dawn l-oġġetti huma meħtieġa għall-użu esklussiv f'reatturi żgħar ta' l-ilma, u meta dan il-forniment, bejgħ jew trasferiment huwa meħtieġ għall-koperazzjoni teknika provduta lil Iran mill-IAEA;

(b) l-oġġetti kollha msemmija f'19.A.3 tat-Tieni Kategorija tad-dokument S/2006/815.

Piena.

8. Min jinsab ħati ta' reat kontra dawn ir-regolamenti jista', meta jinstab ħati, jeħel multa ta' mhux iżjed minn 116, 469 euro.

Resolution 1803 (2008)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5848th meeting, on 3 March 2008

The Security Council,

Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006 and its resolution 1747 (2007) of 24 March 2007, and *reaffirming* their provisions,

Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/22), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), and 1747 (2007), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) and which are essential to build confidence, and *deploring* Iran's refusal to take these steps,

Noting with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA's right to verify design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, *emphasizing* that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the Agency's right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right,

which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility,

Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, *commending* the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme in the work plan between the Secretariat of the IAEA and Iran (GOV/2007/48, Attachment), *welcoming* the progress in implementation of this work plan as reflected in the IAEA Director General's reports of 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), *underlining* the importance of Iran producing tangible results rapidly and effectively by completing implementation of this work plan including by providing answers to all the questions the IAEA asks so that the Agency, through the implementation of the required transparency measures, can assess the completeness and correctness of Iran's declaration,

Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution, that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,

Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), and *noting* the confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme is restored, it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Having regard to States' rights and obligations relating to international trade,

Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Actions Task Force (FATF) to assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolution 1737 (2006),

Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran's development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran's continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), *mindful* of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms* that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to

build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, *affirms* its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006), and *underlines* that the IAEA has sought confirmation that Iran will apply Code 3.1 modified;

2. *Welcomes* the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues concerning Iran's nuclear programme and progress made in this regard as set out in the Director General's report of 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), *encourages* the IAEA to continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues, *stresses* that this would help to re-establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, and *supports* the IAEA in strengthening its safeguards on Iran's nuclear activities in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA;

3. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and *decides* in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein "the Committee") of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I to resolution 1747 (2007) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006);

4. *Underlines* that nothing in paragraph 3 above requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) and resolution 1747 (2007), including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

5. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex II to this resolution as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

6. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 above shall not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified

on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the present resolution;

7. *Decides* that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annexes I and III to this resolution, and any persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them and to persons and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

8. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:

(a) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2 of document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 5 of resolution 1737 (2006), of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in sections 1 and 2 of the Annex to that document, and sections 3 to 6 as notified in advance to the Committee, only when for exclusive use in light water reactors, and where such supply, sale or transfer is necessary for technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices as provided for in paragraph 16 of resolution 1737 (2006);

(b) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in 19.A.3 of Category II of document S/2006/815;

9. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance in entering into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade, in order to avoid such financial support contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

10. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid such activities contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

11. *Calls upon* all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to inspect the cargoes to and from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods prohibited under this resolution or resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

12. *Requires* all States, in cases when inspection mentioned in the paragraph above is undertaken, to submit to the Security Council within five working days a

written report on the inspection containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, as well as information on its time, place, circumstances, results and other relevant details;

13. *Calls upon* all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above;

14. *Decides* that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the measures imposed in resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution;

15. *Stresses* the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote resumption of dialogue, and consultations on the basis of their offer to Iran, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of this issue which would allow for the development of all-round relations and wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, and inter alia, starting direct talks and negotiation with Iran as long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA;

16. *Encourages* the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks;

17. *Emphasizes* the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by the present resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

18. *Requests* within 90 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

19. *Reaffirms* that it shall review Iran's actions in light of the report referred to in the paragraph above, and:

(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;

(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), and in paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

20. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex I

1. Amir Moayyed Alai (involved in managing the assembly and engineering of centrifuges)
2. Mohammad Fedai Ashiani (involved in the production of ammonium uranyl carbonate and management of the Natanz enrichment complex)
3. Abbas Rezaee Ashtiani (a senior official at the AEOI Office of Exploration and Mining Affairs)
4. Haleh Bakhtiar (involved in the production of magnesium at a concentration of 99.9%)
5. Morteza Behzad (involved in making centrifuge components)
6. Dr. Mohammad Eslami (Head of Defence Industries Training and Research Institute)
7. Seyyed Hussein Hosseini (AEOI official involved in the heavy water research reactor project at Arak)
8. M. Javad Karimi Sabet (Head of Novin Energy Company, which is designated under resolution 1747 (2007))
9. Hamid-Reza Mohajerani (involved in production management at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan)
10. Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Naqdi (former Deputy Chief of Armed Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research/Head of State Anti-Smuggling Headquarters, engaged in efforts to get round the sanctions imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007))
11. Houshang Nobari (involved in the management of the Natanz enrichment complex)
12. Abbas Rashidi (involved in enrichment work at Natanz)
13. Ghasem Soleymani (Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the Saghand Uranium Mine)

Annex II

A. Individuals listed in resolution 1737 (2006)

1. Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development
2. Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)
3. Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager (Arak)

B. Individuals listed in resolution 1747 (2007)

1. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)
2. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center, which is part of the AEOI's Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities)

Annex III

1. Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. (BK Co.) (involved in the production of centrifuge components)
2. Barzagani Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies (subsidiary of Saccal System companies) (this company tried to purchase sensitive goods for an entity listed in resolution 1737 (2006))
3. Electro Sanam Company (E. S. Co./E. X. Co.) (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
4. Ettehad Technical Group (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
5. Industrial Factories of Precision (IFP) Machinery (aka Instrumentation Factories Plant) (used by AIO for some acquisition attempts)
6. Jabber Ibn Hayan (AEOI laboratory involved in fuel-cycle activities)
7. Joza Industrial Co. (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
8. Khorasan Metallurgy Industries (subsidiary of the Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG) which depends on DIO. Involved in the production of centrifuges components)
9. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company (subsidiary of the DIO. Its role is to manufacture power units for the Iranian military including missile systems)
10. Pishgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries (has participated in construction of the Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan)
11. Safety Equipment Procurement (SEP) (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)
12. TAMAS Company (involved in enrichment-related activities. TAMAS is the overarching body, under which four subsidiaries have been established, including one for uranium extraction to concentration and another in charge of uranium processing, enrichment and waste)