

A.L. 14 ta' l-2007

**ATT DWAR POTERI LI JSIRU REGOLAMENTI  
FL-INTERESS NAZZJONALI  
(KAP. 365)**

**Regolamenti ta' l-2007 dwar Sanzjonijiet tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti  
fir-rigward tar-Repubblika Iżlamika ta' l-Iran**

BIS-SAHHA tas-setghat moghtija bl-artikolu 3 ta' l-Att dwar Poteri li jsiru Regolamenti fl-Interess Nazzjonali, il-Prim Ministru ghamel dawn ir-regolamenti li ġejjin:-

**1.** It-titolu ta' dawn ir-regolamenti hu Regolamenti ta' l-2007 dwar Sanzjonijiet tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti fir-rigward ta' l-Iran. Titolu u Applikabilità.

**2.** F'dawn ir-regolamenti, kemm-il darba r-rabta tal-kliem ma tkunx tehtieg xort'ohra – Tifsir.

“l-Att” tfisser l-Att dwar Poteri li jsiru Regolamenti fl-Interess Nazzjonali;

“l-Annex” tfisser l-Annex tar-Risoluzzjoni skond il-regolament 3 ta' dawn ir-regolamenti;

“IAEA” tfisser *International Atomic Energy Agency*, Aġenzija ta' l-Enerġija Atomika Internazzjonali.

“Iran” tfisser ir-Repubblika Iżlamika ta' l-Iran;

“hwejjeg perikolużi” tfisser kull haġa, materjal, tagħmir, oġġetti u teknoloġija li l-provvista, bejgh u trasferiment tagħhom mhux ippojbbit direttament bir-regolament 4 ta' dawn ir-regolamenti, imma li jistghu jiġu wżati biex isahhu l-attivitajiet nukleari ta' l-Iran, ir-riproċessar jew il-*heavy water* u l-iżvilupp ta' sistemi li jwasslu l-armi nukleari.

“hwejjeg relatati ma' l-armi nukleari” tfisser il-hwejjeg kollha, materjal, tagħmir, oġġetti u teknoloġija li jistghu jsahhu l-attivitajiet nukleari ta' l-Iran, ir-riproċessar jew il-*heavy water* u l-iżvilupp ta' sistemi li jwasslu l-armi nukleari.

“il-Kumitat” tfisser il-Kumitat tal-Kunsill tas-Sigurezza tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti li jikkonsisti fil-membri kollha ta’ dak il-Kunsill li jwettqu l-hidmiet kollha stabbiliti fil-paragrafu 18 tar-Riżoluzzjoni;

“il-Kunsill tas-Sigurezza” tfisser il-Kunsill tas-Sigurezza tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti.

“ir-Riżoluzzjoni” tfisser ir-Risoluzzjoni msemija fir-regolament 3 ta’ dawn ir-regolamenti.

Test  
tar-Riżoluzzjoni  
1737 (2006).

**3.** Għall-fini ta’ l-artiklu 3 (4) ta’ l-Att, Riżoluzzjoni numru 1737 (2006) adottata mill-Kunsill tas-Sigurezza tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti fit-23 ta’ Diċembru, 2006, qeghda tiġi pubblikata fl-ilsien Ingliż fl-Iskeda li tinsab ma’ dawn ir-regolamenti.

Projbizzjoni ta’  
provvista ta’  
hwejjeġ relatati ma’  
l-armi nukleari.

**4.** (1) Il-provvista, bejgħ jew trasferiment dirett jew indirett, minn Malta jew minn ċittadini ta’ Malta, jew billi jintużaw bastimenti jew arjuplani li jtajru l-bandiera ta’ Malta, ta’ hwejjeġ relatati ma’ l-armi nukleari lejn, jew għal benefiċċju ta’, jew għall-użu fl-Iran, huwa projbit.

(2) Il-provvista, bejgħ jew trasferiment dirett jew indirett minn Malta jew minn ċittadini ta’ Malta, jew billi jintużaw bastimenti jew arjuplani li jtajru l-bandiera ta’ Malta, għal benefiċċju ta’, jew għall-użu fl-Iran, ta’ hwejjeġ ohra li jistgħu jikkontribwixxu għat-twettiq ta’ attivitajiet relatati ma’ kwistjonijiet li fuqhom l-IAEA uriet thassib jew għadhom mhux issewtejjati huwa projbit.

Obbligu ta’ avviz  
lill-Kumitat.

**5.** Il-provvista, bejgħ jew trasferiment ta’ hwejjeġ perikolużi, li l-esportazzjoni tagħhom lejn l-Iran mhix projbita mir-regolament 4 ta’ dawn ir-regolamenti, hija projbita jekk id-dritt li ssir verifika ta’ l-iskop aħhari ta’ dawn l-oġġetti u tal-post fejn dan l-iskop aħhari se jintlaħaq

(a) ma jkunx inghata jew, jekk inghata, ma jistax jiġi eserċitat b’mod effettiv, jew

(b) jekk il-Kumitat ma jiġix avżat fi żmien għaxart ijiem b’dil-provvista, bejgħ jew trasferiment.

Projbizzjoni tal-  
provvista ta’  
għajnuna teknika.

**6.** Il-provvista lill-Iran ta’ kull għajnuna jew taħriġ tekniku, għajnuna finanzjarja, investiment, *brokering* jew servizzi ohra, u t-trasferiment tar-riżorsi jew servizzi finanzjarji, relatati mal-provvista, bejgħ, trasferiment, manifattura jew użu ta’ hwejjeġ relatati ma’ l-armi nukleari msemija fir-regolament 4 ta’ dawn ir-regolamenti huwa projbit.

**7.** Huwa projbit liċ-ċittadini ta' Malta, jew billi jintużaw bastimenti jew ajruplani li jtajru l-bandiera ta' Malta, li jiġu akkwistati hwejjeg relatati ma' l-armi nukleari mill-Iran, sew jekk dawn joriġinaw mit-territorju ta' l-Iran sew jekk le.

Projbizzjoni ta' ksib ta' hwejjeg relatati ma' l-armi nukleari.

**8.** Il-miżuri imposti bir-regolamenti 4 u 6 ta' dawn ir-regolamenti ma japplikawx meta l-Kumitat jistabbilixxi minn qabel u dejjem f'kull każ għalih li l-provvista, bejgħ, trasferiment jew ghotja ta' dawn il-hwejjeg jew għajnuna tkun turi biċ-ċar li mhux se tikkontribbwixxi għall-iżvilupp tat-teknoloġiji fl-Iran li jappoġġaw il-proliferazzjoni ta' l-attivitajiet nukleari u ta' l-iżvilupp ta' sistemi li jwasslu l-armi nukleari, inklużi fejn dawn il-hwejjeg jew għajnuna jkunu għall-ikel, agrikoltura, skopijiet mediċi jew minhabba f'xi esiġenza umanitarja, sakemm

Eżenzjonijiet.

(a) il-kuntratti għall-kunsenja ta' dawn il-hwejjeg jew għajnuna jkunu jinkludu garanziji adatti ta' l-iskopijiet tagħhom; u

(b) l-Iran jassigura li mhux se juża dawn il-hwejjeg għall-proliferazzjoni ta' attivitajiet nukleari jew għall-iżvilupp ta' sistemi li jwasslu l-armi nukleari.

**9.** (1) Il-Kumitat għandu jiġi avżat jekk jidhlu f'Malta jew jgħaddu mit-territorju ta' Malta persuni msemija fl-*Annex*, kif ukoll persuni ohra msemija mill-Kunsill tas-Sigurezza jew mill-Kumitat bħala nies li huma mdahhla, jew direttament assoċjati ma' jew jappoġġaw il-proliferazzjoni ta' attivitajiet nukleari jew għall-iżvilupp ta' sistemi li jwasslu l-armi nukleari, inkluż jekk ikollhom x'jaqsmu fil-ksib ta' hwejjeg relatati ma' l-armi nukleari.

Dhul f'Malta jew passaġġ ta' persuni involuti fi programmi ta' proliferazzjoni ta' l-armi nukleari.

(2) Xejn imsemmi fis-subregolament (1) ta' dan ir-regolament m'għandu jobbliga lil Malta li ma thallix ċittadini tagħha jidhlu fil-pajjiż.

(3) Il-miżuri imposti bis-subregolament (1) ta' dan ir-regolament ma japplikawx meta l-Kumitat jistabbilixxi li dan l-ivvjagġar huwa ġustifikat minhabba f'xi esiġenza umanitarja, inkluża obbligazzjoni reliġjuża, jew meta l-Kumitat jiddeċiedi li eżenzjoni tista' ġġib 'l quddiem l-obbjettivi tar-Risoluzzjoni.

**10.** (1) Kull flejjes, attiv finanzjarju iehor u rizorsi ekonomiċi li jkunu qegħdin f'Malta fit-23 ta' Diċembru jew wara u li jappartjenu lil jew ikkontrollati direttament jew indirettament minn persuni jew entitajiet imsemmija fl-*Annex*, kif ukoll persuni jew entitajiet ohra msemija mill-Kunsill tas-Sigurezza jew mill-Kumitat bħala nies involuti jew direttament jappoġġaw il-proliferazzjoni ta' attivitajiet

Iffriżar ta' flejjes u attiv finanzjarju.

nukleari jew għall-iżvilupp ta' sistemi li jwasslu l-armi nukleari, jew minn persuni jew entitajiet li jaġixxu f'isimhom jew fuq ordni mogħtija lilhom, jew minn entitajiet li jkunu jappartjenu lilhom jew kontrollati minnhom, għandhom jigu ffrizati minnufih sakemm il-Kunsill tas-Sigurezza jew il-Kumitat ma jnehhix dawn il-persuni jew entitajiet mill-*Annex*.

(2) Ebda ċittadin ta' Malta jew persuna jew entità f'Malta ma tista' tagħmel għad-disponibilità flejjes, attiv finanzjarju iehor jew riżorsi ekonomiċi lil jew għall-benefiċċju ta' persuni jew entitajiet imsemmija fis-subregolament (1) ta' dan il-regolament.

(3) Id-disposizzjonijiet ta' dan ir-regolament ma japplikawx għall-flejjes, attiv finanzjarju iehor u riżorsi ekonomiċi li jkunu ġew stabbiliti mill-awtoritajiet ta' Malta:

(a) bħala meħtieġa għal spejjes bażiċi, inluż il-hlas għall-ikel, kera jew *mortgage*, mediċini u kura medika, taxxi, *premiums* ta' l-assigurazzjoni, u hlasijiet għall-utilitajiet pubbliċi jew esklużivament għall-hlas ta' drittijiet professjonali raġonevoli u l-hlas lura ta' spejjeż imġarrba assoċjati ma' l-ghoti ta' servizzi legali, jew drittijiet jew hlasijiet għal servizzi ta' rutina għaž-żamma jew manutenzjoni ta' flejjes iffrizati, attiv finanzjarju iehor u riżorsi ekonomiċi, wara li jingħata avviż lill-Kumitat ta' l-intenzjoni li tiġi awtorizzata, meta dan ikun adatt, l-aċċessibilità għal dawk il-flejjes, attiv finanzjarju iehor u riżorsi ekonomiċi, u sakemm ma tingħatax deċiżjoni negattiva mill-Kumitat, dak li jinsab hawn qabel imsemmi għandu jsir fi żmien hamest ijiem tax-xogħol minn meta jingħata dak l-avviż;

(b) bħala meħtieġa għal spejjeż straordinarji, sakemm deċiżjoni bħal dik tkun ġiet avżata lill-Kumitat u tkun ġiet approvata mill-Kumitat; jew

(ċ) bħala l-mertu ta' rahan ġudizzjarju, amministrattiv jew ta' arbitraġġ, jew ta' sentenza, f'liema każ il-flejjes, attiv finanzjarju iehor u riżorsi ekonomiċi jistghu jintużaw biex jissodisfaw dak ir-rahan jew dik is-sentenza:

Iżda dak ir-rahan jew dik is-sentenza għandhom ikunu ingħataw sehh qabel it-23 ta' Diċembru 2006 u ma jkunux għall-benefiċċju ta' persuna minn dawk imsemmija fir-regolament 9 jew fis-subregolament (1) ta' dan ir-regolament, u jkunu ġew avżati lill-Kumitat.

(4) Xejn imsemmi fis-subregolament (1) ta' dan ir-regolament m'ghandu jzomm persuni jew entitajiet imsemmija milli jaghmlu l-hlas obbligatorju taht kuntratt li sar qabel ma dawn il-persuni jew entitajiet gew imnizzla fil-lista, sakemm

(a) il-kuntratt ma jkunx relatat ma' hwejjeg relatati ma' l-armi nukleari, ghajnuna, tahrig, ghajnuna finanzjarja, investiment, *brokering*, u servizzi msemmija fir-regolamenti 4 u 6 ta' dawn ir-regolamenti; u

(b) il-hlas ma jkunx direttament jew indirettament moghti lill-persuni jew entitajiet imsemmija konformement mas-subregolament (1) ta' dan ir-regolament.

**11.** Hu projbit li jiġi provdut tagħlim speċjalizzat jew tahrig lil Projbizzjoni ta' ghotja ta' tagħlim jew tahrig speċjalizzat. ċittadini ta' l-Iran, f'Malta jew minn ċittadini ta' Malta, ta' dixxiplini li jistgħu jikkontribwixxu għall-proliferazzjoni ta' attivitajiet nukleari u għall-iżvilupp ta' sistemi li jwassslu l-armi nukleari.

**12.** Min jinsab hati ta' reat kontra dawn ir-regolamenti jista', Piena. meta jinsab hati, jehel multa ta' mhux iżjed minn hamsin elf lira Maltija.

## **Resolution 1737 (2006)**

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5612th meeting, on  
23 December 2006**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006,

*Reaffirming* its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

*Reiterating* its serious concern over the many reports of the IAEA Director General and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to Iran's nuclear programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General, including IAEA Board resolution GOV/2006/14,

*Reiterating* its serious concern that the IAEA Director General's report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns on Iran's nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,

*Reiterating* its serious concern over the IAEA Director General's report of 28 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27) and its findings, including that, after more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern, and that the IAEA is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,

*Noting* with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director General's reports of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53) and 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required of it by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution

1696 (2006) and which are essential to build confidence, and *deploring* Iran's refusal to take these steps,

*Emphasizing* the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and *noting* that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere, and *welcoming* the continuing commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative to seek a negotiated solution,

*Determined* to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran's development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of this resolution have been met,

*Concerned* by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran's continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), *mindful* of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

*Acting* under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Affirms* that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions;

2. *Decides*, in this context, that Iran shall without further delay suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities:

(a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and

(b) work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA;

3. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, namely:

(a) those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814;

(b) those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer of:

(i) equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water reactors;

(ii) low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;

(c) those set out in document S/2006/815, except the supply, sale or transfer of items covered by 19.A.3 of Category II;

(d) any additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined as necessary by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 18 below (herein “the Committee”), which could contribute to enrichment-related, or reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

4. *Decides* that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of the following items, materials, equipment, goods and technology:

(a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities;

(b) any other items not listed in documents S/2006/814 or S/2006/815 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

(c) any further items if the State determines that they would contribute to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns or identified as outstanding;

5. *Decides* that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 the export of which to Iran is not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b), 3 (c) or 4 (a) above, States shall ensure that:

(a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and

(b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and

(c) they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer; and

(d) in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer;

6. *Decides* that all States shall also take the necessary measures to prevent the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above;

7. *Decides* that Iran shall not export any of the items in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;

8. *Decides* that Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports, and *calls upon* Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol;

9. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above shall not apply where the Committee determines in advance and on a case-by-case basis that such supply, sale, transfer or provision of such items or assistance would clearly not contribute to the development of Iran's technologies in support of its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and of development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including where such items or assistance are for food, agricultural, medical or other humanitarian purposes, provided that:

(a) contracts for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate end-user guarantees; and

(b) Iran has committed not to use such items in proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

10. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and *decides* in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to this resolution (herein "the Annex"), as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above;

11. *Underlines* that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

12. *Decides* that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and that the measures in this paragraph shall cease to apply in respect of such persons or entities if, and at such

time as, the Security Council or the Committee removes them from the Annex, and *decides further* that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these persons and entities;

13. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant States:

(a) to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;

(b) to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee;

(c) to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;

(d) to be necessary for activities directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) and have been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;

14. *Decides* that States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;

15. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 12 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that:

(a) the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above;

(b) the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 12 above;

and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, ten working days prior to such authorization;

16. *Decides* that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or where it is necessary for projects directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above, but that no such technical cooperation shall be provided that relates to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities set out in paragraph 2 above;

17. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

18. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:

(a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;

(b) to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding the actions taken by the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 16 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;

(c) to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution;

(d) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;

(e) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 3 above;

(f) to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;

(g) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and any relevant identifying information;

(h) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;

19. *Decides* that all States shall report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 above;

20. *Expresses* the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 above as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, *underlines* the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, *encourages* Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and *stresses* that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;

21. *Welcomes* the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme;

22. *Reiterates* its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, *commends* and *encourages* the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, *underlines* the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme;

23. *Requests* within 60 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

24. *Affirms* that it shall review Iran's actions in the light of the report referred to in paragraph 23 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:

(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations;

(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12 of this resolution as soon as it determines that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 23 above shows that Iran has not complied with this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and *underlines* that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

25. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

## **Annex**

### **A. Entities involved in the nuclear programme**

1. Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran
2. Mesbah Energy Company (provider for A40 research reactor — Arak)
3. Kala-Electric (aka Kalaye Electric) (provider for PFEP — Natanz)
4. Pars Trash Company (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA reports)
5. Farayand Technique (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA reports)
6. Defence Industries Organisation (overarching MODAFL-controlled entity, some of whose subordinates have been involved in the centrifuge programme making components, and in the missile programme)
7. 7th of Tir (subordinate of DIO, widely recognized as being directly involved in the nuclear programme)

### **B. Entities involved in the ballistic missile programme**

1. Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
2. Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
3. Fajr Industrial Group (formerly Instrumentation Factory Plant, subordinate entity of AIO)

### **C. Persons involved in the nuclear programme**

1. Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development
2. Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager (Arak)
3. Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)
4. Ehsan Monajemi, Construction Project Manager, Natanz
5. Jafar Mohammadi, Technical Adviser to the AEOI (in charge of managing the production of valves for centrifuges)
6. Ali Hajinia Leilabadi, Director General of Mesbah Energy Company
7. Lt Gen Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri, Rector of Malek Ashtar University of Defence Technology (chemistry dept, affiliated to MODALF, has conducted experiments on beryllium)

### **D. Persons involved in the ballistic missile programme**

1. Gen Hosein Salimi, Commander of the Air Force, IRGC (Pasdaran)
2. Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi, Head of the AIO

3. Reza-Gholi Esmaeli, Head of Trade & International Affairs Dept, AIO
4. Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar, Head of Finance & Budget Dept, AIO

**E. Persons involved in both the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes**

1. Maj Gen Yahya Rahim Safavi, Commander, IRGC (Pasdaran)